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The “Crisis” of the European Border Regime: Towards a Marxist
Theory of Borders
euronomade.info/
by NICHOLAS DE GENOVA.*
 
 
 
Ever since Marx and Engels proclaimed in The Communist Manifesto that the workers have no country, it has been
an elementary and defining premise of Marxist politics that we are internationalists1.  There has never been a more
clear proof that Stalinism involved a radical betrayal of Marxism, furthermore, than the devious and self-serving
proposition that it was possible to build “socialism in one country”.  Indeed, the prominence of the word
“international” in the name of this journal is meant to confirm its commitment to a specifically Marxist socialist politics
while also emphatically distinguishing itself from the wretched counter-revolutionary legacy of Stalinism.  It is
instructive to take this fundamental internationalist perspective of any genuinely Marxist politics as a starting point
for any Marxian reflection on questions of migration and borders.  After all, we are left to wrestle with a very
meaningful and consequential paradox:  the workers have no country, and yet we live in a world of supposedly
separate and distinct “countries,”  – a world partitioned into “national” states.
A Marxist politics of internationalism must necessarily offer a rigorous critique of nationalism, but there can be no
adequate critique of nationalism without a theory of the state, particularly as “the” state everywhere refers to a
multiplicity of separate and distinct states, which usually fashion themselves quite emphatically as “national.”  Given
the global configuration of the capitalist world economy, we must therefore be able to account for why it is that
instead of a global state, we have a great proliferation of territorially-defined and delimited (nation-)states. 
Therefore, understanding the very process by which a state is thus territorially delimited — understanding, in other
words, how a state comes to be defined by borders — should be a central problem in accounting for the relation
between the territorially-defined (“national”) state and global capital.  Furthermore, if the workers as a class on a
global scale have no country, there is surely no better lived and embodied example of this proposition than those
migrant workers who cross nation-state borders.  In short, international migration is never separable from the global
mobility of labour, and any meaningful socialist internationalism must begin from this fact.  In this respect,
theoretically speaking, there can literally be no viable socialist internationalism that does not take migrant labour as
a premier subject of any radical working class politics.
In this article, I will start by reflecting on the beleaguered figures
of migration and refugee movements into and across Europe,
and therefore will also examine the equivocal figure of the
borders of this ambiguous and amorphous place called
“Europe.”  We must begin by interrogating what has variously
been called the “migrant crisis” or the “refugee crisis”, which is
otherwise taken to signal a “crisis” of the borders of Europe. 
Beyond an examination of the proliferation of discourses of
“crisis,” however, I also want to trouble the very figure of
“Europe”.  Finally, I want to suggest the outline of a way of
theorising this ostensible “crisis” of the European border regime
by reflecting more generally on migration and borders.  I do not intend merely to provide a descriptive historical
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contextualisation of the political economy or geopolitics that may pertain to better comprehending what the current
situation is all about. Rather, I want to elaborate some theoretical tools for thinking about these more elementary
analytical categories — migration, borders, and so forth.  In order to sustain a genuinely Marxist critique, it will be
necessary to refuse to take for granted the very conceptual categories that organise this dominant discourse of the
putative “crisis” of the European border regime.
 
The Proliferation of “Crisis”
 
When a ship transporting as many as 850 migrants and refugees capsized on 19April 2015, all but 28 of the vessel’s
passengers were sent to their deaths in what appears to have been the worst border- crossing shipwreck in the
Mediterranean Sea on record.  This single event instantly established the prospect that 2015 would earn the dubious
distinction of the most deadly year to date for would-be “asylum-seekers” braving Europe’s borders.  Subsequently,
unnumbered capsized “migrant boats” and incidents of mass death turned that grim likelihood into a gruesome truth.
 These human catastrophes at sea have indisputably transformed the maritime borders of Europe into a macabre
deathscape.  Then, on 2 September 2015, social media as well as mass news media were briefly haunted by
photographs of the corpse of a drowned Syrian child, soon identified as Aylan Kurdi, washed ashore in Turkey after
a failed attempt to reach the Greek island of Kos left at least 12 people dead.  Abruptly, the desensitising and rather
cynical rhetoric of a “migrant crisis” began to recede in favour of appeals for compassion in the face of tragedy,
accompanied by a reinvigorated (if ephemeral) language of “refugee crisis”2.
The putative “crisis” surrounding the influx of migrants and refugees in Europe — and the border spectacle that it
generates3 — is nowhere more extravagantly put on display than in the Mediterranean Sea.  Indeed, for several
years now, the European Union (EU) has converted the Mediterranean into a mass grave.  The singularity or
momentousness of the 19 April shipwreck was in fact only apparent, however, because it came as merely the most
ghastly and most publicised in a long and unrelenting list of comparable episodes that have utterly banalised such
human disasters, and which have continued during the ensuing months.  Prior to the record- high death toll of 2015,
untold tens of thousands of (ordinarily nameless) refugees, migrants and their children have been consigned to
horrific, unnatural, premature deaths by shipwreck and drowning, often following protracted ordeals of hunger, thirst,
exposure and abandonment on the high seas4.
Prospective migrant shipwrecks have perhaps been abated intermittently (and inconsistently) during one or another
period of heightened search-and-rescue operations by the various enforcers of the borders of Europe. But it is
likewise probable that countless potential incidents of mass migrant and refugee deaths at sea have been
circumvented by the sheer versatility of migratory movements as migrants and refugees have sought alternate
routes over land in the aftermath of such human tragedies.  Hence, following the April shipwreck, although there
continued to be a record-high volume of migration across the central Mediterranean for months, there was also
increasing evidence of a massive re-orientation of migratory movement to land routes through the Balkans.
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Of course, the option of illegalised travel by land routes is also
treacherous:  hunger, thirst, exposure, abandonment and the
related lethal risks are not the exclusive travails of maritime
journeys.  On 27 August 2015, Austrian police discovered an
abandoned meat truck on the highway at Nicklesdorf near the
Hungarian border in which the bodies of 71 (mainly Syrian and
Iraqi) migrants and refugees  were decomposing in a sealed
refrigeration compartment. Hundreds if not thousands of
migrants and refugees have died of asphyxiation after extended
periods of overcrowded transit by road or rail in sealed,
unventilated shipping containers and other means of clandestine (illegalised) transport over land. Others have
merely met their doom after dangling precariously from the bottoms of moving trains and trucks.  In addition,
migrants must navigate the sometimes deadly violence of European border enforcement authorities, as well as their
“non-European” counterparts to whom they frequently outsource the most aggressive sorts of border policing, as
well as other European police forces routinely engaged in the everyday work of superintending migrant
precarity5. Indeed, another form of border casualty arises from the lack of access to critical healthcare during
extended periods of migrant transit, or the callous disregard for migrant and refugee medical needs during detention
or deportation.  Furthermore, any consideration of the diffuse violence of these extended border zones must not
neglect to consider the less systematic but no less systemic physical attacks of far right anti-immigrant racists6.
Regardless of the specific sites and forms of bordering, migrants’ and refugees’ lives have been mercilessly
sacrificed — usually with callous disregard, occasionally with sanctimonious hypocrisy — in the interests of
instituting a “new” Europe encircled by ever- increasingly militarised and securitised borders.  Hence, following the
reports of the 19 April shipwreck, as has happened repeatedly so many times before and since, European
authorities were immediately catapulted into a political frenzy to redress this “tragedy of epic proportions”7.
Predictably, however, despite the obligatory pronouncements of exalted humanitarian ideals, the ensuing discourse
was compulsively preoccupied with “illegal” migration and the “criminal” predations of “smugglers” and “traffickers”
as pretexts for renewed and expanded tactics of militarised interdiction, including proposals to bomb the coasts of
Libya from which many maritime border crossers have been departing, or even to deploy ground troops.8. With a
dominant discourse that strategically likened migration across the Mediterranean (now equated with “human
trafficking”) to slavery9, the invocation of tragedy was cynically conscripted to supply the pretext for the fortification of
various forms of border policing. This only acted to excacerbate the material and practical conditions of possibility for
the escalation in migrant deaths, inevitably serving to channel illegalised human mobility into ever-more perilous
pathways and modes of passage.  If migrant “smuggling” is to be genuinely likened to slave trading, it is precisely
the European authorities who have the power completely (and more or less immediately) to eliminate it — by
reversing the very border enforcement that makes it an utter necessity. Part of the official debate turns on the
question of various formulations of a kind of military humanitarianism, whereby European authorities may be
charged with expanded responsibilities for the “rescue” of so-called “migrant boats” in distress on the high
seas10. Nevertheless, every ostensible rescue comes to be haunted for the illegalised border crossers by the
ambiguous prospect of interdiction, apprehension and indefinite detention, with deportation as a defining horizon. 
Indeed, the commonplace deployment of the term “asylum-seeker” inherently invokes the spectre of the allegedly
“bogus” refugee seeking undue benefits or the “undeserving” migrant opportunistically claiming asylum.  Indeed,
people on the move across state borders are not in fact considered to be the genuine bearers of any presumptive
(purportedly universal) “human right” to asylum but rather are always under suspicion of deception and subterfuge,
produced as the inherently dubious claimants to various forms of institutionalised international protection.  Similarly,
the presumptive and pervasive depiction of refugees as (mere) “migrants” has been a crucial discursive manoeuvre
in the spectacle of Europe’s border “crisis”.  Little surprise, then, that begrudging gestures of belated magnanimity
towards those who may ultimately be granted the status of bona fide “refugees” by European authorities have been
coupled with promises of speedy expulsion for those who may eventually be deemed to be only “migrants” —
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illegalised, presumably undesirable and deportable.
Mass media news coverage has vacillated remarkably between depictions of a European “refugee crisis” and the
label “migrant crisis” (an implicitly derisive term to the extent that it contributes to casting doubt over the validity of
the refugees’ claims for asylum).  Ambivalence and equivocation around the very labels by which various forms of
human mobility are presumed to be knowable are telling signals of the ambiguities and contradictions that bedevil
such terminological categories as governmental contrivances11. The vexed question of how most appropriately to
characterise people on the move across nation-state borders is commonly deferred to an eventual decision on the
part of the “proper” governmental authorities, the ostensible “experts”, who purport to manage Europe’s border
regime by sorting and ranking distinct categories of mobile people — in this case, assessing asylum claims and
adjudicating the matter of who may qualify as a “legitimate” and “credible” refugee.  Accordingly, until such a day of
reckoning, all refugees tend to be reduced to the presumed status of mere “migrants”. Again, we are reminded that
the very term “asylum seeker” is predicated upon a basic suspicion of all people who petition for asylum within a
European asylum system that has routinely and systematically disqualified and rejected the great majority of
applicants, and thereby ratifies anew the processes by which their mobilities have been illegalised12.
The ongoing “crisis” of European borders, therefore, corresponds above all to a permanent epistemic instability
within the government of transnational human mobility, which itself relies upon the exercise of a power over
classifying, naming and partitioning “migrants”/ “refugees,” and the more general multiplication of subtle nuances
and contradictions among the categories that regiment mobility.  Indeed, such a proliferation arises as an
inescapable effect of the multifarious reasons and entangled predicaments that motivate or compel people to move
across state borders, or alternately find themselves stranded en route, temporarily but indefinitely stuck someplace
along the way on their migratory itineraries.  Refugees never cease to  have aspirations. Against the dominant
tendency to figure them as pure “victims” (and thus as the passive objects of others’ compassion, pity or protection),
they remain subjects who make more or less calculated strategic and tactical choices about how to reconfigure their
lives and advance their life projects despite the dispossession and dislocation of their refugee condition.  In other
words, in these fundamental ways, all refugees resemble “migrants”.  And likewise, migrants are often “in flight” (or
“fleeing”) from various social or political conditions that they have come to consider intolerable, thereby actively
“escaping” or deserting forms of everyday deprivation, persecution or (structural) violence that may be no less
pernicious for their mundanity.  Hence, migration may often be a way to flee from social conditions marred by all the
indignities of poverty and the routine but no less contemptible injustices of local hierarchies.  Thus, many migrants
also resemble “refugees”.  Hence, the labels “migrant” and “refugee” commonly remain suspended in a state of
tension and ambiguity, and may only be sorted into neat and clean distinctions, or separated by hermetically-sealed
partitions, through more or less heavy-handed governmental interventions.
In the face of the resultant proliferation of alternating and
seemingly interchangeable discourses of “migrant” or “refugee
crisis”, the primary question that must be asked, repeatedly, is: 
Whose crisis?  Describing the situation as a “crisis” appears to
be precisely a device for the authorisation of exceptional or
“emergency” governmental measures aimed at enhancing and
expanding border enforcement and immigration policing13.  The
spectacle of Europe’s “migrant crisis” is largely equated,
consequently, with a crisis of control over the ostensible borders
of Europe.  One such European border, configured at the port of
Calais in France near the entrance to the Channel Tunnel
connecting Britain to the continent, has long been a site where
migrants have regrouped their energies during more or less
protracted periods of deceleration in the makeshift migrant and
refugee camps notoriously known as “the Jungle”14. Following militant strike action by French port and ferry
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workers, a few thousand migrants and refugees charged the Eurotunnel barriers during the end of July 2015 in an
effort to board trucks and trains heading into Britain, provoking massive traffic delays.  French authorities deployed
riot police and the British constructed a new razor wire fence.  Confronting this “Calais crisis,” British Prime Minister
David Cameron reacted with promises of deportations and alarmist calls for moreaggressive border policing to stop
the migrant “swarm,” accompanied by a clamour of British tabloid newspapers calling for the authorities to “send in
the army”15.
Remarkably, by August, September and October 2015, literally from week to week and even day to day, the apparent
“frontline” of European border struggles was repeatedly dislocated from one country to another, oftentimes further
and further removed from any imagined outer periphery or frontier of “Europe”, in a dramatic dialectic of contestation
between diverse migrant and refugee autonomies and a haphazard variety of tactics of bordering.  These ostensible
“frontline” dramas of the borders of Europe had moved decidedly inward, from the shores of Italy, Malta and Greece
(or Greece and Bulgaria’s land borders with Turkey) to Macedonia, Serbia and Hungary, then further still into Austria
and Germany, and then back again to Croatia and Slovenia.  By November, Germany, Austria, the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and Sweden had all begun to reintroduce temporary
border controls. Pronouncements that the Schengen agreement  was effectively “dead” became commonplace16.
Then, the grisly spectacle of “terrorism” in Paris on 13 November 2015 supplied the catalytic event that could
conjure anew the well-worn spectre of “Muslim extremism”. Ornamented with a (fake) Syrian passport conveniently
deposited in the vicinity of one of the bombings, the horrific bloodbath in the heart of genteel Europe was quickly
conscripted to allege that the seemingly uncontrollable refugee influx was somehow providing cover for a
nefarious ambush by the putative “enemies” of “civilisation” itself, and therefore that the “refugee” (or “migrant”)
“crisis” truly represented a “security” threat, after all17. Immediately following the events in Paris, within a few hours
— and within days of having been branded a “lawless slum” that presents the risk of an “infiltration” of “guerrilla
warfare” — the migrant and refugee camps at Calais were subjected to a suspected arson attack18
In the ensuing days, amidst the predictable (indeed, obligatory) speculations about a hydra-headed phantasm of
“foreign fighters” and “home-grown extremists” travelling unhindered between combat zones in Syria and western
European countries, France — long among the most stalwart advocates of European integration — stridently called
for an unprecedented securitisation of the external borders of the EU’s Schengen zone of “free” mobility.  Within a
week of the events, amidst police raids against Muslim “suspects” across multiple countries, and various calls for
mass internment, deportations, and the electronic monitoring of such “suspects,” EU interior and justice ministers
convened an “emergency” meeting and vowed to institute significantly tighter external border controls and expanded
surveillance over human mobility, of citizens and non-citizens alike.  The urgent push to create  new “hotspot”
migrant and refugee reception and processing facilities (i.e. detention camps) at sites of illegalised border crossing,
likewise, came now to be re-imagined as a matter of perimeter defence against “terrorist” infiltration, with these
borders re-figured as vital strategic sites for “culling terrorist wolves from refugee sheep”19.
Despite the fact that all of the alleged culprits  of the Paris shootings identified were in fact (racialised “minority”)
Europeans, the spectacle of terror nevertheless served quite effectively as a virtually unquestionable pretext for
dramatically reinvigorated border enforcement. Soon thereafter, following the Paris events and numerous other
incidents in 2015 that fashioned the figure of Europe’s “Muslim” Other in securitarian terms (as a “threat” of religious
“fundamentalism,” “fanaticism” and “terrorism”), there followed the  abrupt outbreak in January 2016 of a moral
panic over multiple sexual assaults during the New Year’s Eve festivities in Cologne.  Allegedly perpetrated by
“unruly mobs” of young men, casually characterised as being “of North African or Middle Eastern appearance” (and
eagerly depicted as including recently arrived “asylum-seekers”), this hysteria notably reinvigorated the racialisation
of “Muslim” identity.  In the face of these offences, the racialisation of “Muslims”/“Arabs” could now be represented in
terms of unsavoury “cultural” differences that must be castigated and criminalised as transparently inimical to
purportedly “European” values.  Thus, once confronted with the palpable presence of recent arrivals of “Muslim”
refugees and migrants, the apparent danger of “terrorism” was followed up with a much broader projection of
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gendered and sexualised menace, and “criminality” more generally.  Even the tragic figure of 3 year old Aylan Kurdi
— the Syrian refugee boy whose death by border shipwreck became such a a catalytic image in September — had
by January (following the Cologne scandal) been viciously affiliated by the anti-Muslim racists of Charlie Hebdo with
the grotesque spectre of ape-like (Muslim male) sexual predators. Whereas “anti-terrorist” suspicion follows a rather
selective logic that has been mobilised for the purposes of more stringent (external) border enforcement, the
propagation of the idea of allegedly “uncivilised” (“Muslim”) cultural difference has been promptly re-purposed as a
considerably more expansive problem of (internal) policing.  Most importantly, the specific instances of sexual
harassment and sexual predation have been immediately and emphatically conjoined to arguments for new powers
to hasten the deportation of any and all “criminal” asylum-seekers.  Thus, refugees, formerly (if very briefly) figured
as “deserving” of compassion and protection, have been very rapidly re-fashioned — first as potential “terrorists”
who surreptitiously infiltrate the space of Europe, and then as potential “criminals” or rapists who corrode the social
and moral fabric of “Europe” from within.
 
Border Struggles
 
Notably, brutal border spectacles of “exclusion” have often exposed their own obscene dynamics of subordinate
(illegalised) migrant “inclusion”20. The various deployments of troops or riot police against migrants and refugees,
the construction of razor-wire barricades and assaults against migrant and refugee families with tear gas, stun
grenades and rubber truncheons, have been intermittently alternated with the outright facilitation of these same
migrant movements through the provision of bus caravans and trains to expedite transit onward.  Hence, state
tactics of bordering have been abundantly shown to be convulsive reaction formations, responding always to the
primacy of the sheer autonomy of migration21.
This was perhaps nowhere more dramatically manifest than the self-mobilisation on 4 September 2015 of refugees
and migrants who had been encamped in Budapest’s Keleti railway station.  Hungarian riot police had begun to
deny migrants access to trains by which they aspired to travel on to Austria and Germany and had attempted to
forcibly evacuate some of them.  Following various skirmishes with the riot police in the makeshift refugee camp in
the train station, and then a devious re-routing of trains by the authorities toward “transit” (detention) camps outside
of the city, at least 1,000 migrants and refugees chanting “Freedom!” indignantly coalesced into an ad- hoc protest
march (quickly designated the “March of Hope”).Following the determined leadership of a one-legged man, they
proceeded onto a six-lane highway leading out of the country.  This action promptly culminated in the Hungarian
state authorities’ capitulation and compliance, albeit cynical and self-serving, with the urgency of the refugees’
determination to freely move forward on their chosen itineraries.  The march was provided a police escort and then
buses that would transport the unruly refugees and migrants further along on their journeys toward the next border. 
Likewise, Austria and Germany promptly confirmed that their borders were open22.
 Just the day before, Hungary’s right-wing prime minister Viktor
Orbán had proclaimed that Europe’s putative magnanimity
towards refugees and migrants was “madness,” and argued that
his attempts to close the border with Serbia with a razor-wire
fence were a matter of defending Europe’s “Christian roots”
against a Muslim menace23.
Orbán has repeatedly declared baldly that Hungary does not
welcome the prospect of granting residence to refugees,
and Muslim refugees in particular.  Earlier in the summer,
Hungary had already announced its refusal to honour the Dublin
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regulation (by which other European signatory states could deport refugees to Hungary if they had first been
registered as asylum claimants there).  In short, much like Italy, Malta, Greece and Bulgaria previously, Hungary
— now as a “frontline” defender of the borders of the EU — had come to actively resist the imperative that it do the
proverbial “dirty work” of insulating the wealthiest EU member states from migrant and refugee mobilities seeking
ultimately to resettle where they would have better prospects.
Such junior partners in the fragmented and externalised bordering of “Europe” — including EU member states (such
as Hungary), non-EU European states (such as several Balkan countries), and “non-European” states
subcontracted to pre-empt migratory movements before they ever reach European territory (from Turkey through
North Africa, and even several sub- Saharan African countries) — have been poignantly depicted as “wardens of the
European border regime”24  Indeed, as in the case of Hungary, the more aggressive tactics in Europe’s extended
border zones have sometimes served proactively (and cynically) to re-direct human mobilities onward toward other
borders within other states’ jurisdictions.  Then, in September, Hungary instituted emergency legislation in the
border zone that threatened all border crossers with up to three years imprisonment, in flagrant disregard for any
and all petitions for asylum — in an extravagant gesture of renewed commitment to its assigned role in enforcing the
borders of “Europe”.  “Paradoxically,” as Bernd Kasparek and Marc Speer underscore, “Hungary is now being
pilloried for its callous attempts at maintaining the rules of the European border and migration regime, while
Germany, regardless of its role as architect and driving force of that very regime, wins worldwide acclaim for its
humanitarian stance”25
Indeed, after having initially opened their borders to the mass movement of refugees and migrants, Austria and
Germany were later prompted to re-institute their own border controls in the face of the sheer volume and velocity of
human mobility through Hungary, in order to better “manage” the “crisis.”  Most importantly, despite their more
draconian proclivities, Hungarian authorities opted to do nothing in the face of the refugees’ defiant march through
Budapest except assist them on their way toward the border with Austria.  Thus, the example of Hungary is merely
the most dramatic instance of a recurrent vacillation between vicious violence and begrudging complicity on the part
of state powers seeking to re-institute Europe’s borders in the face of the veritable incorrigibility of migrant and
refugee movements.  The “crisis” of border control and “migration management” may therefore be seen to be a crisis
of state sovereignty that is repeatedly instigated, first and foremost, by diverse manifestations of the autonomous
subjectivity of human mobility itself.
What is fundamentally a moment of governmental impasse — in short, a “crisis” of territorially-defined state power
over transnational, cross-border human mobility — has been mobilised and strategically deployed as “crisis” for the
reconfiguration of tactics and techniques of border policing and immigration and asylum law enforcement.  The
uneven geopolitics of policing the borders of “Europe” and the heterogeneous tactics of various nation states for
managing the resultant “crisis”, as we have seen, have riddled the project of European integration and border
harmonisation with its own irreconcilable contradictions.  Meanwhile, EU citizens have mobilised solidarity
campaigns under the banner of “Refugees Welcome” and, most poignantly, organised automotive caravans to
openly provide material and practical assistance to refugees in the completion of their cross-border journeys from
Hungary into Austria and Germany, in flagrant defiance of legal prohibitions that would construe such acts of
compassion and solidarity as the “trafficking” or “smuggling” of “illegal” migrants, and hence as criminal offences.
These actions have only served to amplify and telescope the fracture between the power of European states and
large numbers of their own citizens who sided with the migrants’ and refugees’ struggles26.  In other words, such
solidarity movements help to underscore a fracture between the presumptive sovereignty of state powers and the
communities otherwise figured as the polities from which such claims to sovereign power are purported to be
“democratically” derived.  Thus, the larger conflictive processes of bordering “Europe” have generated a still larger
political crisis for the European Union more generally.  In this regard, it is the incorrigible autonomy of migration that
has instigated a crisis for “Europe” as such.
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A Question of “Europe”
 
It is not difficult to see that the strategies and tactics of bordering, even when they are anticipatory and presumably
regulatory — that is, whether they are intended to preempt or, alternately, to facilitate or even proactively channel
one or another formation of border crossing — are always themselves embedded within larger reaction formations. 
In other words, the tactics of bordering can be understood to be reactions because they are responses to the prior
fact of human mobility on a global scale, and consequently take shape in reaction to all the unpredictable and
incorrigible dimensions of the elementary subjectivity and autonomy of migration.  The profound source of the
intractable “crisis” of migration in Europe mustconsequently be seen as a veritable struggle over the borders of
Europe — migrants’ and refugees’ struggles to realise their heterogeneous migratory projects by exercising their
elementary freedom of movement, thereby appropriating mobility, transgressing the border regime as well as the
struggle of European state powers to subdue and discipline the autonomy of migration27.
Notably, the European border “crisis” has been commonly depicted in depoliticising language as a “humanitarian”
crisis with its root causes always attributed to troubles “elsewhere,” usually in desperate and chaotic places
ostensibly “outside” of Europe.  These putative “elsewheres,” beyond the borders of Europe, are systematically
represented as historically sanitised, which is to say, shorn of their deeply European/ (post)colonial histories as well
as disarticulated from the European political and economic interests implicated in producing and sustaining their
fractured presents.  The refugees and migrants whose mobilities may be productively understood to appropriate the
space of “Europe” (cf.) nevertheless most commonly originate from places across Africa, the Middle East and Asia
that were formerly the outright or de facto colonies of European masters28. In effect, migrants arriving in Europe
today, much as has been true for several decades, originate from places that were effectively mass-scale prison
labour camps where their forebears contributed to collectively producing the greater part of the material basis for the
prosperity, power and prestige of Europe historically.  Virtually all migrations and refugee movements that today
seek their futures in Europe have been deeply shaped by an indisputably European (colonial) past.  Furthermore,
particularly for those who flee the devastation of war and military occupation or civil war — from Afghanistan or Iraq
to Syria, Libya, Somalia or Mali (to name but a few) — the expansive human consequences of what Derek Gregory
has incisively called the (U.S.-dominated, global) “colonial present” (cf.) are likewise inextricable from their
entrenched and enduring European (“post”-colonial) entanglements29. Consequently, with the imposition,
enforcement and continuous reconfiguration of a “European” border over the last decades, a brave new “Europe”
has, in effect, been busily redrawing the colonial boundary between a “European” space largely reserved “for
‘Europeans’ only” and the postcolonial harvest of centuries of European exploitation and subjugation30. It is a new
Europe fortified by very old and morbid cruelties.
The spatialised partitioning of “Europe” from its putative
“outside” notably begins within Europe itself, where the borders
of “Europe” and the boundaries of  “European”-ness have
repeatedly been re-instituted in the uneasy borderlands that
extend eastward.  The legacies of the Cold War have ensured
that some regions of “the East” of Europe have been, and
largely remain, a crucial reserve of migrant labour, both within
and across the borders of EU citizenship and mobility31.  This is
particularly pertinent with regard to the Balkans, as Europe
extends eastward towards Turkey as perhaps the most enduring
Orientalised frontier.  Hence, the recent prominence of the
“Balkan route” for migrant and refugee movements has been
haunted by the awkward fact that several European countries themselves have yet to be admitted into the self-
anointed circle of genuine and proper “European”-ness.  Moreover, while there are intimations that some of these
8/17
illegalised mobile subjects (Syrians in particular) may ultimately be recognised to be credible and worthy recipients
of the status of “refugees,” there are concurrent and insistent assurances by various European authorities that
speedy deportation will be the rightful fate for others who may be rejected as mere “migrants,” notably including
those originating in the Balkan countries themselves32. The duplicitous insinuation here is that the devastating
effects of the internecine violence of the Yugoslavian civil wars can now be assumed to be simply over and done
with, and consequently that human mobilities from the Balkan region are purely “economic” in motivation. In
addition, we must also be alert to the systematic deployment of “Balkan” and other “eastern European” regional or
national-origin categorisations as evasive euphemisms for Roma (“Gypsy”) identities, in particular33. As one of the
foundational and constitutive “internal” racial Others of Europe, the Roma are now reconstructed anew as a mobile
(racialised, criminalised) menace to the stability and integrity of (western) European “civilisation”, whose flight from
protracted poverty and entrenched marginalisation must not even conceivably be apprehensible as the mobility of
“refugees” fleeing institutionalised persecution and structural violence in Europe34.
Consequently, the “crisis” of European borders is eminently political, in manifold ways. Most importantly, these
struggles expose the fact that the borders of “Europe” are never reducible to anything resembling immutable,
integral, internally consistent or objective boundaries corresponding to any self-evident “natural” fact of physical
geography.   Nor can these European borders be apprehensible as simply the outward projections of a stable and
coherent centre, whereby the socio-political, “cultural” or “civilisational” identity and spatial integrity of “Europe” may
be presupposed in contradistinction with a variety of othernesses “beyond” or “outside” the ostensible limits
demarcated by those boundaries.  Instead, Europe’s borders, like all borders, are the materialisations of socio-
political relations that mediate the continuous production of the distinction between the putative “inside” and
“outside,” and likewise mediate the diverse mobilities that are orchestrated and regimented through the production
of that spatial divide.  Thus, with respect to the abundant inequalities of human mobility, the borders of “Europe” are
simultaneously entangled with a global (postcolonial) politics of race that re-draws the proverbial colour line and re-
fortifies “European”-ness as a racial formation of whiteness, and a comparably global (neoliberal) politics of
transnational labour mobility and capitalist labour subordination that produces such spatialised (and racialised)
differences, above all, to capitalise  upon them35.
To the extent that the European Union entails a transnational and partially supranational juridical and political
formation, however, with an extraordinarily variegated and graduated spectrum of differential (and never perfectly
harmonised) arrangements that regulate and modulate its “internal” and “external” relations, a high degree of
instability and mobility is inherent in the very existence of the externalised and virtualised borders that may now be
characterised as “European.”  Thus, “Europe” presents to us today a transnational and intercontinental laboratory
for the neoliberal regimentation and subordination of human powers and freedoms in relation to the space of the
planet.
For many illegalised “asylum seekers,” braving the horrors of the European border regime comes only after fleeing
from all manner of atrocities, persecution and misery in their countries of origin and, commonly, also in numerous
other countries of “transit,” crossed en route to Europe, which have been materially and practically incorporated to
various extents into the externalised policing of the frontiers of “Europe”.  For most of these same refugees as well
as many others who migrate in the quest to make a better life for themselves and their loved ones, the vicious
severities of this extended and expansive European border-zone present a fierce endurance test, a preliminary
apprenticeship in what promises to be a more or less protracted career of migrant “illegality,” precarious labour and
deportability36. However, whether these mobile subjects come to be governed as “refugees” or “migrants”, their
needs, desires, and aspirations always supersede this death-defying obstacle course — albeit, at times, at the cost
of their lives.  Little surprise, then, that one mode of critical response to the European border regime’s ultimate
responsibility for the April shipwreck was to invoke an analogy with the premier slogan of contemporary African
American civil rights struggles in the United States — Black Lives Matter — by insisting that Migrant Lives Matter . 
Here, we are reminded that in the European context, the very figure of migration is racialised, even as dominant
discourses of migration in Europe systematically disavow and dissimulate race as such37. Haunted as Europe’s
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borders are by this appalling proliferation of (almost exclusively non-European/ non- white) migrant and refugee
deaths and other forms of structural violence and generalised suffering, anyone interested in the politics of class and
race today cannot avoid confronting the urgent and anxious question of the borders of Europe, and therefore must
inevitably come to recognise that the question of Europe itself has become inextricable from the question of
migration38.
A genuinely critical examination of borders and migration in Europe unsettles and destabilises “Europe” as taken for
granted assumption, and instigates a confrontation with the problem of “Europe” itself39. Much as the borders of
Europe have been instituted and are constantly being policed for the sake of stabilising and purportedly “protecting”
the space of “Europe” — first and foremost, and above all, as a preserve for the presumable birthright entitlements
of “Europeans” — the unrelenting struggle over the autonomous mobility of “non- Europeans” across those symbolic
and material boundaries continuously instigates a re-staging of the borders of “Europe” as sites of their own
subversion, and concomitantly, as the scene for the spectral un-doing of “Europe” itself.  The borders of Europe
therefore present a premier site for the enactment and disputation of the very question of and about “Europe”:  the
question of “Europe” itself has become inextricable from the question of migration.
 
Theorising the Migrant-Refugee-Border “Crisis”
 
In the foregoing, I have already begun to introduce a series of crucial concepts that can serve the task of sustaining
a viable critique.  Now, I would like to approach our subject anew through a series of more directly, explicitly and
emphatically theoretical gestures.
Borders are not inert, fixed or coherent “things.”  Rather, as in Marx’s analysis of capital, borders are better seen as
socio-political relations.  What is at stake in these relations, which are indeed relations of struggle, is the rendering
of borders into seemingly fixed and stable thing-like realities with a semblance of objectivity, durability and intrinsic
power.  Thus, the agonistic coherence and ostensible fixity of borders — their thing-like qualities — only emerge as
the effect of active processes by which borders must be made to appear thing-like.  In other words, they must be
continuously objectified through repetitive practices and discourses.  This very process of transposing what is in fact
always an unresolved social relation into the semblance of a durable objective reality, however, implies that the
objectification of borders is inherently fraught and antagonistic.  The struggles at and around borders are struggles
over the open-ended process of continuously objectifying borders (the process of making borders into objects, or
objective facts), and thereby lending them the fetishised quality of unquestionable realities with a power unto
themselves.
The objectification and fetishisation of borders, therefore, may
be best apprehended if we appreciate that bordering is indeed a
verb, and signals a process of border-making.  Simply put,
bordering — border-making activity — involves productive
activity, work, a kind of labour. The very acts and processes that
produce borders, however, are the very same socio-political
activity that subsequently comes to look like some sort of
natural and inevitable result of borders as such.  In other words,
rather than see borders as the cumulative effect of the diverse
acts of bordering (such as passport checks, policing, fences,
etc.) — instead of seeing “the border” as the product of all this
work, in other words — we are induced to see all these
heterogeneous human activities as merely subsidiary or derivative features that emanate from the apparently
already-existing reality and objectivity of borders as such.
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Once objectified thus, we may nevertheless recognise borders to be enduringly productive.  Borders, in this sense,
may be considered to be a kind of means of production — for the production of space, or indeed, the production of
difference in space40.  As enactments in and upon space, like any means of production, borders must themselves
be produced and continuously re-produced.  Yet, as a means of production, borders are generative of larger spaces,
differentiated through the relations that they organise and regiment, facilitate or obstruct.
Customarily, we have perhaps been inclined to conceive of these spatial differences as the differentiation of nation-
state spaces, but as the convulsive supra-national space of the EU or the historical spaces of empire readily confirm,
territorially-defined spaces of state formation have always been historically specific, contingent and heterogeneous. 
Nonetheless, the differences that borders appear to naturalise  — between “us” and “them,” between “here” and
“there” — are in fact generated precisely by the real incapacity of borders to sustain and enforce any rigid and
reliable separations.
Borders today seem to have become inextricable from migration, and are made to paradoxically appear to be both
“the problem” and “the solution”.  Borders, then, are notably perceived to be always-already violated, and thus
perpetually inadequate or dysfunctional, if not frankly corrupted.  And this is true in spite of ever-increasing border
securitisation; indeed, the securitisation of borders only intensifies the perception that they are in fact always
insecure, supplying the premier site for staging the perpetual demand for more securitisation41. No number of
borderzone arrests or deportations could ever be sufficient to sustain the semblance of “security” but rather only the
seeming verification of a thankless and relentless task, a job that can never be completed.
Here, as I have already argued, human mobility always comes first.  Muchas the subjective (creative, productive)
force of labour necessarily always precedes its objectification as capital, the primacy of the autonomy and
subjectivity of human freedom of movement is a recalcitrant and obstreperous force that precedes and exceeds any
border authority’s capacities for comprehensive regimentation and control.  Once bordered, which is to say, once
subjected to one or another tactic of bordering, the autonomy and subjectivity of the varieties of human mobility that
are thereby construed as border-crossing come to be known as “migration”.  Thus, the autonomy and subjectivity of
human mobility always instigates the reaction formations of bordering that convert particular forms of human
mobility into the bordered social formations that we come to know (only retrospectively) as “migration”.  Hence, if
there were no borders, there would be no migrants — only mobility.  As we have seen repeatedly with the recent
translation of the putative “crisis” of the European asylum and migration regime into a veritable re-bordering of the
EU’s Schengen zone of “free mobility” through the re-instituting of border checkpoints in the name of enhancing
“control,” the ubiquity of migrant mobilities comes first; the ubiquity of borders and the diverse panoply of new
techniques and technologies of border policing and immigration enforcement come always as a response on the
part of the state. Indeed, migration regimes signify precisely the politicisation of the elemental human freedom of
movement by subjecting human mobilities to state power.
These processes of subordinating human mobilities to the sovereign power of states and border regimes are
fundamentally implicated in the larger production of spatialised difference that I have identified with borders.  That is
to say, the bordering of mobilities is also a process for the production of difference, and its effects are differentially
distributed.  Therefore, although borders are ideologically constructed and celebrated as if their real purpose were
simply “exclusion” — functioning as a barrier that “protects” what is inside by shutting out what is outside —  they
operate in fact in ways that are much more equivocal, as amorphous zones that can be permeated and
transgressed, and thus, as sites of encounter and exchange.  In spite of the semblance of inadequacy or
dysfunction, whereby borders appear to be wracked by “crises” because they are so persistently violated or
transgressed, borders nonetheless serve quite effectively and predictably as filters for the unequal exchange of
various forms of value42The filtering character of borders is especially visible in those instances where the
intensified enforcement of border crossings of easiest passage relegates illegalised migrant mobilities into zones of
more severe hardship and potentially lethal passage, as we have seen with the conversion of the Mediterranean into
a space of mass death.  In a de facto process of artificial selection, these deadly obstacle courses serve to sort out
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the most able-bodied, disproportionately favouring the younger, stronger and healthier among prospective (labour)
migrants, and disproportionately favouring men over women.  The militarisation and ostensible fortification of
borders, furthermore, prove to be much more reliable for enacting a strategy of capture than as mere technologies
of exclusion.  Once migrants have successfully navigated their ways across such borders, the onerous risks and
costs of departing and later attempting to cross yet again become inordinately prohibitive.
The more extravagant border policing becomes, the more in fact it participates in what I have called the Border
Spectacle – persistently and repetitively implicating the materiality of border enforcement practices in the symbolic
and ideological production of a brightly lit scene of “exclusion” that is always in reality inseparable from an obscene
fact of subordinate (illegalised) inclusion that transpires in its shadows43. Thus, in our efforts as radical activists to
denounce the extremities and severities of plainly cruel modes of exclusion, we risk forfeiting the
critical responsibility to also detect how regulatory regimes produce regularities44 Indeed, we risk failing to see that
migrant “irregularity” (“illegality”) is itself a very regular and predictable feature of the routine and systematic
functioning of border and immigration enforcement regimes, and thus, we risk an unwitting complicity with the
supreme monologue of the Border Spectacle itself, by recapitulating its dominant theme of “exclusion”.  Hence,
rather than adopting political positions that treat borders as purely exclusionary and consequently promoting such
slogans as “Open the borders!” in the (liberal) spirit of advocating greater “inclusion”, what we really need to
advance instead is the abolition of all borders as an elementary and defining feature of the capitalist state.  Through
borders, states legally and politically produce and mediate the social and spatial differences that capital may then
capitalize upon and exploit.
Much of my previous work has similarly been dedicated to problematising any simplistic binary of “inclusion” and
“exclusion,” in part through the elaboration of the concepts of “inclusion through illegalisation”45 and “inclusion
through exclusion”46.  Here, it is important to underscore that the illegalisation or irregularisation of migrants —
precisely, as labour — is always a kind of subordinate incorporation.  This sort of inclusion may be best depicted as
obscene precisely because it is not merely concealed, but also selectively revealed.  What constitutes the obscene
is not that it remains hidden but rather that it gets exposed.  Thus, the spectacle of border policing stages the
regulatory regime of immigration enforcement as always besieged by the inexorable “invasion” or “inundation” of
“illegal” migrants, and in this manner routinely serves to verify precisely the regularity of “irregular” migrants’
obscene inclusion and the sheer banality of their despised presence within the space of the state.47.
If borders are productive of differences in material and practical ways, then it is crucial to note that they not only
involve a physics (through the mobilisation of various practices and material technologies of bordering) but also
sustain a definite metaphysics.  The metaphysics of borders is centrally implicated in the particularisation of the
political (as a feature of the global relation of labour and capital).  Politics is thus made particular according to
distinct histories of struggle in specific places.  But the generalised dominant form for this global political relation
involves a universalisation and normalisation of the “national” state form.  The “national” (territorially defined and
delimited) form of the state has therefore become the standard framework of “politics” in a nationalist world order. 
Simply put, borders constantly reinforce the ideological image of a world composed of “nations” and “national”
states, to which all territory — and importantly, all people — must consistently and exclusively correspond.  This
metaphysics of borders plays a role on an effectively global scale.  Indeed, we may be reminded here of Hannah
Arendt’s memorable depiction (following the Second World War) of “the new global political situation” as “a
completely organised humanity” resembling a “barbed-wire labyrinth”48. Borders, as we have come to know them,
do not only distinguish the official outer limits of state territory and institute the division between one space of
sovereign power and another, but also subdivide the planet as a whole.  In so doing, borders also subdivide
humanity as a whole49. Consequently, in a world where the workers truly have no country, they are nonetheless
made to appear to be first and foremost the “nationals” (or “citizens”) of one or another state.
Borders cross everyone, including those who never cross borders.  As socialists, then, we must confront this
fundamental problem:  Will we finally become the (witting or unwitting) accomplices of border policing, even if only
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by adopting uncritically the nationalist standpoint of the state that presumes to act as the sovereign power behind
any given border regime?  Or alternately, as genuine internationalists, will we align ourselves conscientiously on the
side of our own elementary freedom of movement and reject all (nation-)state borders, and struggle deliberately for
the fundamental reconfiguration of the relation between the human species and the space of the planet?
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